Broad on the afterlife

From p.57 of "Autobiography" (1959) in The Philosophy of C. D. Broad, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company):

"So far as I can tell, I have no desire to survive the death of my present body, and I should be considerably relieved if I could feel much surer than I do that no kind of survival is possible. The only empirical basis on which I can appraise life after death, if such there be, is what I know of life here and what mediums tell us of life hereafter. On neither basis of valuation does the prospect of survival hold any charms for me. Having had the luck, it seems to me, to draw an eel from a sack full of adders, I do not wish to risk putting my hand into the sack again. And the prospect of an unending 'pleasant Sunday afternoon' in a nonconformist chapel on the astral plane would not attract me, even if I could find it credible"

On the relation between Philosophy and Economics

From p.15-16 of "The Local Historical Background of Contemporary Cambridge Philosophy", in C. A. Mace (ed.) (1957) British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (London: G. Allen and Unwin) pp. 13-61.

"It was doubtless inevitable that economics, when it grew up to be a huge and highly complex subject, should leave the home of its childhood and set up house for itself. I do not know whether this separation from moral science has been harmful to Cambridge economics, but I am inclined to think that it may have been unfortunate in certain respects for Cambridge philosophy. It is noteworthy that since those days philosophy in Cambridge has been almost completely out of touch with general history, with political theory and sociology, and with jurisprudence. This has no doubt saved it from many temptations to vague and pretentious verbiage, and from the danger of philosophizing with one eye on contemporary politics. But it has involved the complete neglect of much that is a proper subject for philosophic analysis and speculation, and which has in fact always formed an important part of philosophy in other places and in Cambridge itself at other times."

On philosophy as a disease

from p.102 of "Philosophy" Inquiry 1:1-4 (1958) 99-129

"An influential contemporary school, with many very able adherents in England and the U.S.A., would reduce philosophy to the modest task of attempting to cure the occupational diseases of philosophers. In their writings the word 'philosopher' is commonly used to denote the holder of some opinion, or more accurately the utterer of some sentence in the indicative mood, which, the writer regards as characteristically fatuous. If this is what one thinks about one's own occupation, it is certainly honest to announce the fact. It is not for me to judge whether it is altogether prudent for professional philosophers thus publicly to proclaim that their business is to take in and wash each other's dirty linen. Nor will I speculate on how long an impoverished community, such as contemporary England, will continue to pay salaries to individuals whose only function, on their own showing, is to treat a disease which they catch from each other and impart to their pupils."

Broad on Ward

From p.35 of "The Local Historical Background of Contemporary Cambridge Philosophy", in C. A. Mace (ed.) (1957) British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (London: G. Allen and Unwin) pp. 13-61.

On James Ward (Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy at Cambridge between 1897 and 1925), Broad writes:

"Throughout his life he remained a convinced theist and a stern puritan. A sincerely good and deeply religious man, with a melancholy disposition, a dyspeptic stomach, and a sharp tongue, he had all those virtues which have tended to make virtue so unpopular."

Broad's "System"

From p.77 of "Critical and Speculative Philosophy" in J. H. Muirhead (ed.) (1924) Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements (London: G. Allen and Unwin) pp.77-100. (Available here)

"I have nothing worth calling a system of philosophy of my own, and there is no other philosopher of whom I should be willing to reckon myself a faithful follower. If this be a defect I see no likelihood of its ever being cured. Secondly, if I had a system of my own, I should doubt the propriety of "pushing" my crude philosophical wares in competition with the excellent products of older firms with well-earned reputations."

On science and philosophy...

From p.96 of "Critical and Speculative Philosophy", in J. H. Muirhead (ed.) (1924) Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, (London: G. Allen and Unwin) pp. 77-100.

"We are all familiar with the nonsense which eminent philosophers have talked about scientific questions; it is only equalled by the nonsense which eminent scientists continually talk about philosophical questions."

On science and religion:

From "The present relations of science and religion." Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 54 (April, 1939), pp. 131-154.

"I have been obliged to paint the scene as I see it; and the prospects of Christianity, as I see them, are somewhat gloomy unless applied science (that blind Samson) should uproot the pillars of the house and bury pure science with it in the ruins. Though I am not a Christian, and never have been one since I began to think for myself, I take no pleasure in this prospect. Whether Christianity be true or false, Christ's parable about the subsequent fate of the man who was left 'swept and garnished,' after the expulsion of a demon that possessed him, seems to me to be profoundly true of humanity as a whole. Ordinary human nature abhors a vacuum, and it will not for long rest content without some system of emotionally toned and unverifiable apocalyptic beliefs for which it can live and die and persecute and endure. When I contemplate Communism and Fascism, the two new religions which have entered into the clean-swept place and possessed it, and when I consider the probable consequences of their sisterly bickerings, I appreciate the concluding lines of Mr. Belloc's Cautionary Tale about the boy who ran away from his nurse in the Zoo and was eaten by a lion. 'Always keep a hold of Nurse, for fear of finding Something Worse.' "

Broad on Wittgenstein

Two quotes today.

First, from his (1959) "Review of Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir" Universities Quarterly, vol. 13 (May 13) pp. 304-306.

"My impression is that there was for Wittgenstein little or no region intermediate between a state of high and concentrated seriousness and rather simple and sometimes almost crudely "low-brow" interludes. I suspect that this, rather than the alleged "artificiality" of the conversation at the High Table of Trinity, made the latter so distasteful to Wittgenstein. That conversation is the talk of men, all fairly eminent in their respective subjects, relaxing after a fairly tiring day's work. It presupposes common traditions, going back to undergraduate days, and habitual "family" jokes and allusions, and it moves in a sphere equally remote from high seriousness and from horseplay. A major prophet may be an excellent fellow, but he will hardly make an excellent Fellow. And, to pass from the general to the particular, one for whom philosophy is a way of life will find it difficult to associate on easy terms with those (like myself) for whom it is primarily a means of livelihood."

Second, from p.61 his  (1959) "Autobiography", in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of C. D. Broad, (New York: Tudor Publishing Company) pp. 3-68.

"The one duty which I wittingly neglected was to attend the weekly meetings of the Moral Science Club. I am not quick-witted nor quick-tongued enough to take a useful part in philosophical discussion by word of mouth; and I was not prepared to spend hours every week in a thick atmosphere of cigarette-smoke, while Wittgenstein punctually went through his hoops, and the faithful as punctually 'wondered with a foolish face of praise.'"

Broad on Russell

From Critical notice of P. A. Schilpp, The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Mind, vol. 56, no. 224 (October, 1947), pp. 355-364 (pdf here).

"Professor Laird, at the end of his essay, pays an eloquent tribute to the intellectual stimulus which he derived, as an undergraduate at Trinity, from Lord Russell, and the generosity with which Lord Russell gave his time to personal discussions with his pupils. I was an undergraduate at Trinity along with Laird, and I can most heartily confirm on my own behalf all that he says. There is no one philosopher to whom I owe so much as to Lord Russell, and I recall with delight and gratitude the many hours which I spent in his company, his invariable kindness and hospitality, and the wit and charm of his conversation. No man that I know has altered so little for the worse with increasing years. When I meet him and talk to him now, I can shut my eyes and think myself back in bis room in Nevile's Court in those days before 1914, ' the happiness of which it is difficult for those born later to imagine '."

An explanation of this blog's name.

At the end of his 1959 essay "A Reply to My Critics", in in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of C. D. Broad (New York: Tudor Publishing Company) pp. 711-830, C.D. Broad writes:

"... though philosophies are never refuted, they rapidly go out of fashion, and the kind of philosophy which I have practised has become antiquated without having yet acquired the interest of a collector's piece."

I don't know if that was true when Broad wrote it in 1956, but it's not true now. At least, I find these pieces interesting enough to collect; as the placement of the apostrophe suggests, I hope that others will too.